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Abstract — The objective of this paper is to supplement 
Gottlieb’s challenge to Dryfus who claims that concepts are not 
operative in expert’s unreflective actions.  First, concepts that an 
agent develops over time with practice, starting from the stage of 
novelty, become deeply rooted and persist through his expertise 
stage, according to common sense.  It is unlikely that such rooted 
concepts become inoperative just when it is time for the agent to 
put them to use during the time that he is in the zone (i.e., in 
flow).  Second, an expert's inability to remember reasons behind 
his actions while he is in the zone is insufficient to prove that 
concepts are inoperative when he is acting in the zone.   For an 
agent to not remember reasons as such could more likely be a 
consequence of the adequacy of his minimized reflections on his 
maximized (i.e. expert level) concepts, while he is in such a state.  
Moreover, not recalling every reason behind every step of an 
agent’s actions in the zone could be a consequence of his 
maximum concentration on successful processing and 
coordination of the task at hand, as opposed to committing his 
finite mental capacities to memorizing the reasons behind his 
step-by-step actions when he is performing an expert level action 
in the zone.  Third, I point out to the prevalence of examples 
when experts or observers provide testimony about use of 
concepts to strategize or review actions before, during, and after 
their ‘in the zone’ actions (e.g., review of video replays of a game 
or a tournament on sports channels), which supports the 
operations and conceptuality of unreflective actions in flow. 
Keywords — reflective action, conceptuality, unreflective 
action, non-conceptuality, flow, in the zone, myth of the given, 
myth of the mental, space of season, Dryfus, McDowell, Gottlieb 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  The key aim of this paper is to augment Gabriel 
Gottlieb’s  objection to Dryfus’s claim that concepts are not 
operative in expert’s unreflective actions 1 [9].  I argue that 
expert’s testimony, about  neither being aware of reasons nor 
recalling reasons behind his actions, is insufficient to prove 
that concepts or reasons are inoperative when he is acting ‘in 
the zone’ [8].  I suggest that being unaware of reasons, behind 
one's actions in the zone, could likely be a consequence of his  
minimized reflections on his maximized or expert level 
concepts.  Moreover, not recalling every reason behind one's  
actions could be a consequence of his  maximum concentration 
on processing and coordination of his  activity, as opposed to 
committing his finite mental capacities to memorizing the 
reasons behind his  step-by-step actions, when he is in the 
zone.  
To achieve these goals, I begin with a summary of 
Dryfus’s claim that the phenomenon of embodied coping 
reveals that expert actions are primarily unreflective.  
According to Dryfus, an expert is at his best when he is acting 
in the flow, which does not involve mental representations, 
planning, or conceptual activity.  Dryfus argues that in 
unreflective actions, embodied skills and know-how perform 
the role of reflection, but agrees that conceptuality operates in 
the actions of novices.  Additionally, I review McDowell’s  
opposing assertions that mature embodied coping is 
permeated with conceptual mindedness, and that one's  
perceptions and actions are conceptual all the way down [6]. 
After outlining McDowell-Dryfus's debate, I provide a 
synopsis of Gottlieb’s position that practical concepts  and 
unreflective intelligence in lieu of perceptual concepts  operate 
in one's unreflective actions, contrary to Dreyfus’s view.  
Finally, I supplement Gottlieb’s position on unreflective 
action, which points out that the fact that agents fail to notice 
or seem unaware of concepts when acting in the zone, is 
insufficient proof for the claim that concepts are inoperative at 
this level of action. I offer additional reinforcement to defend 
the conceptuality of one's  seemingly unreflective actions by 
arguing that: 
(i) Concepts that an agent develops over time with 
practice, starting from the stage of novelty, become deeply 
rooted and persist in his expertise stage.  It is against common 
sense to accept that expert’s rooted concepts disappear just 
when he puts them to work in action. 
(ii) All else equal, the strengths of an agent’s concepts and 
concentration are inversely proportional to intensity of his 
reflections.  For example, a novice athlete, with under-
developed concepts and weaker concentration skills, need to 
reflect more intensely on more concepts when he plays in a 
game.  Conversely, an expert athlete, with stronger concepts 
and sharper concentration, may find minimal reflections on 
his strengthened concepts sufficient to compete.  An expert 
mentally conditions himself to expend his finite and available 
mental capital to attain optimal performance and results for a 
given task.  Such expert level mental conditioning involves 
leveraging strength of his concepts and sharpening his 
concentration on the activity and its goals as opposed to 
remembering every reasons for his step-by-step actions, which 
may otherwise require only his minimum reflections.  
Therefore an agent’s minimized reflections may be a more 
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plausible culprit for how he may neither notice nor recall 
detailed reasons behind his  actions in flow.  Dryfus claims 
that when experts are in the flow, thinking about actions 
would degrade their performance from expert level to 
competency, and thus concepts have no use in expert’s flow 
activities [8].  Dryfus holds that only after concepts and 
reasoning are relinquished, then one's expertise can return to 
his activity.  However, as noted earlier, an expert’s reflections 
and concentration modulate from minimum to maximum 
depending on the task's performance requirement and its 
difficulty.  Therefore, while maximally concentrating on the 
task at hand, I suggest that an expert could minimally reflect 
on his strong concepts, because minimal reflections may 
simply be sufficient when things are going well, not because 
concepts are disruptive or inoperative or have no use in 
actions in the flow.  
 (iii) An expert and observer testimony about use of 
concepts to strategize and review actions before, during, and 
after the game, supports the operation of conceptual and yet 
seemingly unreflective actions.  
 (iv) And, there are alternative conceptual-friendly 
explanations for the examples Dryfus offers including 
Knoblauch's emotions such as anxiety, worry, or loss of 
confidence, which could have gotten in the way of his game, 
and not Knoblauch's reasoning and concepts  which Dryfus 
assume to have ruined his game and flow.  
II. DISCUSSIONS 
A.  Summary of McDowell-Dryfus Debate and Gottlieb’s 
Objections,  with Emphasis on Unreflective Actions 
(i) Dryfus's View: 
Dryfus asserts that McDowell would be committing the 
myth of mental by “presuming that a linguistic and conceptual 
deconstruction of any clear divide between ‘mind and world’ 
teaches us that perception is conceptual all the way out”.  He 
disagrees with the claim that “actions are conceptual all the 
way down”, and that our “embodied coping is permeated with 
mindedness” [11]-[13][18]. Dryfus claims that we have non-
conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational, and non-mental 
embodied coping skills, some of which we share with pre-
linguistic infants and higher order animals [5][6].  He states 
that much of our encounters with the world is in total 
absorption by way of embodied coping, when we cease to be a 
subject altogether2 [7].  Moreover, when we are in flow “there 
is no experience of an object and so no object to bring under a 
concept3” [15][16]. 
Following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
phenomenological positions, Dryfus holds that we have the 
capacity to engage in many complex or simple embodied 
actions when we get ‘in the zone’ where we can skillfully 
respond to our world without thinking [15].  When we are in 
the zone, affordances and solicitations, mindlessly draw us 
into embodied copings and actions - without the operation of 
concepts4.  In practice, Dryfus views mindedness as the 
enemy of embodied coping5.  We plan beforehand and initiate, 
but when we are in the zone of the activity, we do not 
experience an ego doing it6.  In skillful mindless coping, we 
are at our best, when we unreflectively get absorbed in a space 
that solicits a certain activity7.  Dryfus uses the example of a 
blitz chess player who operate in speedy as ‘in the zone’ type 
actions, when he has no time to think [5].  Dryfus sees the 
chess player as one who does not think but just respond to the 
patterns on the board; and being drawn to act, the chess player 
does what needs to be done.  According to Dryfus, we engage 
the world by way of our skillful body, responding to 
affordances in a certain way and by reacting to solicitations, 
such as pulling our arm towards the doorknob and not the 
coffee mug, move the bishop and not the queen, throw a 
curve-ball and not to second base [8].  Our bodily skillfulness 
responds to our surroundings as a field of “meaningfully 
configured situations that solicit some responses and repels 
others, and our bodily comportments are attuned to thes e 
solicitations” [8].  Dryfus holds that to gain status of expert 
(skill) perceiver or agent, one does not involve the 
internalization of such concepts or reflection, but instead 
short-circuit them by “developing a direct bodily 
responsiveness to the overall configuration of a situation” [6]. 
In order to retain our freedom from the casual world and 
keep our agnatic spontaneity, Dryfus argues that in absorbed 
mindless coping, we are free because we choose to respond, to 
being bound or not, in the flow activity8 [8].  Our second 
nature, acquired from socio-cultural practices is nature too, 
and our expressions of our second nature in unreflective 
bodily coping is not a brutal causal event9 [15].  
We have the capacity to interrupt our bodily absorption in 
the flow, which enables us to step back and reflect, and then 
our self-consciousness reemerges.  Our consciousness may be 
called into action, if our mind detects something has gone 
wrong10 [5][7].  When we are absorbed in everyday skillful 
coping we may well have the capacity to step back and reflect, 
but we may not be able to exercise that capacity without 
disrupting our coping [8].  Dryfus posits that reflecting and 
monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it, leads to a 
performance that is at best competent, and only after 
abandoning monitoring our activity, can we regain our 
expertise. 
In summary, for Dryfus where actions are concerned, 
there are two separate ways of being open to the world—the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual way.  “The conceptual way 
in its pure form describes what happens when one confronts a 
difficult situation, steps back, figures out what to do, and then 
responds competently” [8].  But, in so far as “one is an expert 
in any domain and when things are going well (when he is in 
the zone), one responds directly and transparently to the 
situation’s demands mindlessly” and he remains free to 
choose to be bound in the zone or free himself from it, at all 
times [9]. 
  (ii) McDowell’s Views: 
 McDowell asserts that for mature people, embodied 
coping is permeated by mindedness [12].  He contends that 
mindedness is operative in our unreflective concepts and 
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actions, and this is not incongruent with our immersed bodily 
life11.  McDowell argues that our perception, thoughts, and 
action can only be smooth because our perceptual relation to  
the world is conceptual all the way out.  He reads the 
“phenomenology of embodied coping as supporting his 
recasting of rationality as thoroughly embodied, and suggests 
that it is Dreyfus who is clinging to a detached conception of 
rationality” [18].  McDowell objects to Dryfus’s suggestion 
that mindedness is detached from our immersed bodily life, 
because that would be committing to a kind dualism 
vulnerable to the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect12 [11].  
McDowell also objects to Dryfus claiming that man, in one 
hand, is free and open to bind himself to the affordances and 
solicitations in the zone, and on the other hand he is free to 
step-back from his activities in the zone and reflect on reasons 
and concepts [7].  McDowell implies that such discontinuous 
characterization, of our actions in and out of the zone, 
resembles a “disembodied intellect” [12]. 
Concepts and our capacity for conceptualization are 
operative whether or not we are conscious of them. When a 
chess, baseball, or tennis player starts thinking, “then acting is 
not the basic action and player loses because his means -end 
rationality tries to takes over, but it cannot do as good of a job 
as his skills in controlling bodily movements 13” [11]. 
For McDowell, affordances and solicitations are the same 
once they are made explicit, and both belong to the space of 
reason.  When we learn how to ride a bike, the training wheels 
don’t become invisible.  Similarly, McDowell does not agree 
with cognitivists who claim that when we become experts, our 
rules become unconscious [12].  Both McDowell and Dryfus 
agree that “thanks to socialization, experts conform to reasons 
that can be retroactively reconstructed” [5].  However, 
McDowell claims that reasons are not behind action but are in 
action such as in unreflective ones including the case of 
phronesis14 [5].  Unreflective actions are neither detached nor 
discursive [11].  For the case of phronesis, unreflective action 
is a case of properly formed practical intellect at work. 
Dryfus implies that McDowell is afraid that without 
conceptuality, unreflective actions will not fit in McDowell’s 
space of reason.  McDowell objects to Dryfus trying to forced 
fit unreflective action to be determined by disenchanted causal 
interaction. 
Consequential part of the Dryfus -McDowell debate 
hinges on how unreflective bodily coping or actions are 
conceptual, and how actions are permeated with rationality  
and mindedness. McDowell holds that, while in the 
phenomenology of unreflective actions, there may be an 
appearance of no reasoning, but there is responsiveness to 
reasons and rationality15 [11].  This is because, in our process 
of our upbringing (Buildung) we are initiated into tradition 
and language and inculcated into culture, when we acquire our 
second nature and habits of a distinctively rational form.  He 
states that  “The ability of adult humans to step back, means 
that the same conceptual capacities must be shaping 
experience, whether the subject is unreflectively immersed in 
action or not.  The capacities that are operative in ordinary 
perceptual engagement with the world, and in ordinary bodily 
action, belong to a subject’s rationality in that strong sense: 
"they are conceptual in the sense in which I claim that our 
perceptual and active lives are conceptually shaped” [12]. 
In summary, McDowell rejects the idea of existence of 
non-conceptual experiences [11].  He claims that our 
conceptual content and capacities are already operational in 
our experiencing the world, and because there is spontaneity 
in conceptual capacities, our experience is open to the world. 
Zahavi characterizes spontaneity as a reflective capacity 
and argues that “for McDowell, only a self-conscious subject, 
a subject capable of self-ascribing experiences, can have 
awareness of an objective world”.  On McDowell’s 
understanding it is consequently “the spontaneity of the 
understanding, the power of conceptual thinking, that brings 
both the world and the self into view” [11].  Therefore, for 
McDowell “creatures without conceptual capacities 
consequently lack both self-consciousness and experience of 
objective reality” [16]. 
However, McDowell reading of Knoblauch example, 
emphasizes on the capacity to reflect notwithstanding, 
suggests that he may be open to the idea that being able to act 
skillfully requires temporarily quieting down the ability to 
reflect [12].  
  (iii) Review of Gabriel Gottlieb’s (2011) paper over 
McDowell-Dryfus debate:   
Gottlieb focused on whether embodied coping in speedy 
action is conceptually shaped.  He objects to Dryfus by 
claiming that in speedy actions such as blitz chess, or baseball 
one's reflection may drop out, but that does not by itself prove 
absence of conceptuality16, 17, 18, 19.  Gottlieb objects to Dryfus 
for failing to defend linking why if an action involves 
concepts, then it must involves reflection.  His strategy is to 
“undermine Dreyfus’s general assumption by arguing that 
perceptual concepts (e.g. my chess pieces are white) can 
contribute to perceptual experiences independent of 
reflection” via our practical concepts, such as moving the 
king20 [9].   Gottlieb agrees with Sellars  that at least when it 
comes to perceptual concepts, conceptual inferential activity 
required for experience becomes - through habit and learning - 
a form of non-reflective intelligence that operates at an 
unconscious level21 [17].  The result is that thought, action, 
and experience are conceptual, having the structure of 
judgments, but without the conscious activity of comparison 
and analysis22. 
To respond, Dryfus could shift the burden of proof to 
Gottlieb in that practical concepts are vulnerable to the similar 
kinds of challenge as perceptual concepts, since experts do not 
report any reflection or experience of practical concepts.  
Moreover, the existence and distinction of practical concepts 
from perceptual concepts cannot be taken for granted and 
needs to be substantiated.  Although Dryfus agrees that 
practical wisdom enables one to do things intelligently, 
Dryfus notes that such things are done without explicit 
thought or concepts, as in the case of Aristotle’s 
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phronesis23[8].  Hence, Gottlieb could counter Dryfus by 
arguing that practical concepts and unreflective intelligence 
are operative in our unreflective actions, similar to the case of 
phronesis24.  
In summary, Gottlieb posits that “for an action to be 
informed by concepts, it does not require explicit reflection 
during the experience”.  Gottlieb concedes that Dreyfus might 
be right that “at certain levels in the development of skills, 
reflection on different practical concepts might be needed, and 
that it is possible in some cases for this act of reflection to 
eventually drop out”.  However, he asserts that when our 
reflections drop out, “this does not necessarily mean that our 
practical concepts drop out” [9].  Also, Dryfus, shifting the 
burden of proof on conceptualists, does not prove that 
concepts are not operative for experts  in the zone of actions, 
and Gottlieb throws the same burden of proof back to Dryfus. 
B. Supplementing Gottlieb’s Objection to Dryfus 
So far, I have outlined Dryfus’s position that one's  
conceptual capacities are available and operative sometimes 
but not pervasive in his flow activities.  McDowell position is 
that one's perceptions and actions are conceptual all the way 
down.  To prove his point, Dryfus argues in part that concepts 
must not be operative if agents do not experience them in the 
flow activity.  Because expert’s phenomenological reports 
suggest that concepts are not noticed in speedy actions or in 
flow, and because of the evidence that reflections on concepts 
interfere with one's successful actions, then it is concluded 
that concepts are neither used nor pervasive in such 
activities25.  Gottlieb agrees with MacDowell's view that 
experts not noticing concepts do not automatically prove that 
they are not used, because unreflective actions can be guided 
by expert’s practical concepts  or unreflective intelligence. 
In the proceeding section, by expanding on the 
phenomenology of agent’s actions including the before-
during-after flow experience, I aim to supplement Gottlieb’s 
defense of conceptuality of unreflective actions. 
To achieve this goal, I would argue that (i) Concepts 
grow, take root, and carry over throughout agent’s 
development stages, from novelty to expertise.  It seems 
against common sense to accept that such rooted concepts 
disappear or to imply that they should take a back seat in the 
unconscious or subconscious , just when the expert puts them 
to work in flow action.  It is hard to endorse the idea that an 
expert is better off, if concepts vanished during action; (ii) For 
a given performance, an expert’s maximal strength of 
concepts and sharpened concentration, could demand minimal 
reflection on concepts. This  could be a more plausible 
explanation, compared to Dryfus's, as to how concepts are not 
noticed in flow; (iii) Expert agent and observer often provide 
testimony about use of concepts to strategize and review 
actions before, during (post hoc), and after a flow action such 
as in a game.  This supports the existence and prevalence of 
conceptual, despite seemingly unreflective, actions during 
flow action; (iv) More conceptual-friendly explanations may 
be available with respect to Dryfus’s examples.  For 
Knoblauch’s case, it is more plausible that lack of emotional 
self-confidence caused him to lose his flow, not the 
interference of his concepts or reflections.  Additionally, 
professional athletes may faintly reflect on concepts when ball 
is in their court, however they use the time to reflect (more 
noticeably) and make minor adjustments when the ball is in 
their opponent courts, which is also while they are in the zone. 
The proceeding section contains my discussions to 
support Gottlieb’s defense of conceptuality of unreflective 
actions: 
  (i) Concepts Grow from Novelty and Persist in Expertise: 
Dryfus has outlined five stages in the development of an 
agent’s skill: novice, advanced beginner, competence, 
proficiency, and expertise [2].  Novices learn and reflect on 
concepts over time to enhance their skills until they become 
experts.  Dreyfus posits that after one has gone through the 
learning phase while he was being guided by concepts, then 
he transcends out of that stage and becomes an expert.  At the 
expert stage, he no longer needs concepts at all, according to 
Dryfus.  However, it is only natural for concepts to take root 
and become engrained in agents as they develop from novelty 
to expertise stages.  It is against common sense to concede to 
the idea that expert’s rooted concepts grow and remain 
operative until competency, and then simply vanish from his 
mental operations when it is time for him to put those 
concepts to expert level work.  Moreover, it seems arbitrary to 
accept the proposition that an expert is better off, if his deep 
rooted concepts temporarily became inoperative during his 
expert level action, as implied by Dryfus.   
  (ii) Maximal Strength of Concepts and Maximal 
Concentration  Require Minimal Reflection: For a given 
performance, the strength of expert’s concepts and 
concentration on task at hand is inversely proportional to the 
required reflections.  Because a novice agent's  concepts are 
weaker, more practice and more intense reflections are 
required to enhance his  learning and subsequently improve his 
performance.  Learning means being able to reflect and 
internalize the optimal concepts 26 (or re-write old ones to get 
better at something).  When an agent becomes an expert, 
minimal amount of incremental learning is required as he 
becomes more efficient at what he does. This in turn relaxes 
his need for incremental or additional reflections on his 
actions when he is in the zone27 (or improvement would 
demand minimal need for re-writing an agent’s existing 
concepts).  Ultimately, when an expert gain stronger concepts  
via learning, practicing, and maturing, then minimal 
reflections may be sufficient for him to perform at the top of 
his game.  This is how the strength of one’s concepts is 
inversely proportional to the intensity of his reflections needed 
for a given level of performance in the zone.  
Another important aspect of expert’s functioning in the 
zone is ‘concentration’.  When an agent concentrates on the 
activity and its goals, he zooms his focus on the present time.   
Concentration has two dimensions:  one is about 
concentrating on this task in the here and now, and the other is 
about not concentrating on any other task that is not in the 
here and now. 
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When the agent concentrates, he aims to forget regrets 
about the past (e.g. lost matches, missed opportunities , etc); he 
tries to stop worrying about the future (e.g. what if I lose? 
what happens after this set? and after this game? how will 
family matters, expenses, parent’s illness, and media questions 
shape-up?); and he stays in the present moment, channeling all 
his mental resources on the task at hand the best he can. 
Concentration can quiet the mind. This ability to concentrate 
involves severing or quieting non-essential past and future 
reflections (about all other non-relevant concepts).  Hence, to 
be immersed in an activity such as being in the zone ideally 
requires filtering out all else that gets in the way of that flow 
action. 
Not recalling every reason behind one's  actions could also 
be in part a consequence of his sharpened or maximum 
concentration on processing and coordination of his activity as 
opposed to committing to memory the reason behind his step-
by-step actions, especially in high-speed games28.  With 
agent’s concentration zoomed in on the task at hand  and the 
strength of his deeply rooted concepts in his back pocket, so-
to-speak, his reflections would regulate or modulate down 
sufficiently to the point that he can exercise his top skills and 
attain optimal performance. 
Dryfus holds that only after concepts are relinquished, 
then our expertise can return to action. But, an agent’s 
reflections and concentration can modulate from minimum to 
maximum depending on the level of an agents’ skills and 
concepts about the task at hand.  Hence, it is plausible that an 
expert minimally reflecting on his strengthened concepts 
while sharply concentrating on his  action in the zone is 
because minimal reflections may simply be sufficient when 
things are going well, not because concepts are disruptive or 
inoperative or have no use in actions in flow. 
In summary, strong or maximized concepts operating on 
expert actions with minimized reflections when he is 
maximally concentrating on what matters  (i.e., serving the 
activity and its goal as opposed to memorizing every reasons 
behind every step in the game) could exculpate how experts 
may not notice or recall detailed reasons about their ‘in the 
zone’ actions29. 
  (iii) Concepts Operative Before-During-After the Flow 
Action such as in a Game:  Taking an expert’s testimony 
about his transitions from ‘entering flow’ to ‘exiting flow’ in 
conjunction with his ‘during flow’ perspective may shed more 
light about operation of concepts in one's actions in flow. 
For example, people (e.g., athletes, observers, coaches, 
Sport TV specialists) in professional sports strategize about 
the game (i.e., studying their opponent past techniques, 
weakness, and strengths compared to their own team, 
competitive line up, the coach’s game plan, etc) before the 
game.  After the game, they   review various conceptual 
aspects of their game (e.g. player and team strategic objectives 
versus actual results, shortcomings, reason for bad executions 
of plans, their opponent winning and losing or new strategies, 
etc).  Often, when an athlete watch his  own game’s video re-
plays and respond to reporters about strategies that  worked or 
did not work for him, he offers conceptual explanation.   
Contrary to Dryfus's claim, preponderance of conceptual 
testimony offered by expert observers and athletes about in 
the zone actions before, during, and after makes it much more 
plausible that concepts were in use in the zone than not at 
all30.  
  (iv) Knoblauch Emotions Could Have Gotten In The 
Way, Not His Concepts: There are other conceptual friendly 
explanations for some of the examples that Dryfus has 
offered. Dryfus suggests that Knoblauch’s thinking too much 
about his game caused him to lose the ability to throw the ball 
effortlessly. I suggest that it is more plausible that Knoblauch 
emotional challenges such as loss of confidence ruined his 
game. Only after his emotional challenges, he started thinking 
about his missteps and reasoning to figure out why he was 
failing31.  His emotional imbalance and nervousness caused 
him to lose his flow, not the interference of his reasoning and 
rationalization.   
 Dryfus also suggests that expert’s conceptualization 
cannot be behind the throwing, and if it is, then it can only 
interfere with the absorbed coping32.  Earlier I argued that 
experts’ minimal reflection and their strong concepts may not 
interfere with their absorbed coping and can still be operative.  
For example, professional athletes may faintly reflect on and 
not notice concepts when the ball is in their own side of the 
court, however many athletes testify that they use the time to 
reflect more noticeably and make minor adjustments when 
ball is in their opponent side of the court. A tennis player 
monitors his opponent’s bodily posture and direction of his 
racket to anticipate the trajectory of his opponent’s next move. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 In summary the goal of my paper is  to supplement 
Gottlieb’s objection to Dryfus’s claim that concepts are not 
operative in expert’s unreflective actions.  To achieve this 
goal, I first argued that it is against common sense to accept 
that expert’s rooted concepts become inoperative just when it 
is time for him to put them to work, and that his actions 
become entirely unreflective when he is in the zone.  For 
example, it may seem that we open a door without thinking. 
But we may think about how many steps we need to take 
towards the door depending on how far we are from the door.  
We also may think about how we might use our hands and 
which keys to use depending on if the doorknob is keyed, 
lever, or circular type.  An expert tennis player may not think 
deeply about his move when the ball is in his court, but he 
does think and anticipate a possible trajectory of the ball when 
the ball is in his opponent’s court, and plan his move 
depending on his opponent’s posture and racket movement.  A 
blitz chess player may not think when it is his turn to make his 
move, possibly because he had some time (albeit short) to 
think a little bit and adjust his strategy if needed while the 
opponent was making his move.  Therefore, using some of 
Dryfus’s own example, we can show that some thinking and 
some reflection albeit minimally may be at work, even when 
we are in the zone.  Second, I argued that the strengths of an 
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agent’s concepts and his concentration are inversely 
proportional to the intensity of his reflections. Therefore an 
expert’s minimized reflections may be a more plausible reason 
for how experts, with maximal strength of concepts and 
sharpened concentration, may neither notice nor recall all 
reasons behind their actions in flow. Third, I suggested that 
expert (i.e., agent and observer) testimony about use of 
concepts to strategize and review actions before, during, and 
after a game, supports conceptual and yet seemingly 
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1 The philosophical implications of a study of conceptual and non-conceptual 
unreflective actions are beyond the scope of this paper [1][4][9][15-17]. 
2 Note that Dryfus  asserts ‘that we don’t normally reflect while we act’.  For 
him, when an expert is ‘in the zone’ or in ‘flow’ (used interchangeably), his 
actions are unreflective covering a wide range of actions such as hiking or 
turning a doorknob.  Strength, maximized, or intensity are  intended to have 
the same meaning, as do reasons, rationality, and concepts in this paper [8].  
3 Heidegger and Merleau-Ponti hold that we have sub-rational competences. 
When we interact with the world there is no we and no world, but just 
smoothly flowing activity [4]. 
4 “ In stopping to think, we would dissolve any smooth-flowing skilled bodily 
attunement to what is taking place” [19] . 
5 “Dreyfus equates mindedness with reflection or rational self-monitoring to 
distinguish it  from mindless experiencing” [16]. 
6 “  Dryfus claims that there is no place for experiential content in absorbed 
coping and speaks of the possibility of mind-free practical activity..But, how 
can one meaningfully speak of a phenomenology of mindless coping - as 
Dreyfus repeatedly does – if the coping is completely unconscious?” [16] 
7 Dryfus  implies that reflections are cognitive processes involved in the 
retrieval of relevant and pertinent information, ‘analysis and comparisons of 
alternatives’, and he also classifies explanations as a form of reflection. I 
would argue that for an expert who is performing (acting in the game), his 
reflection would likely contain more retrieval and less process (analysis and 
comparison) since an expert has (through learning, practice, and mat urity of 
his skills) already pre-processed and can anticipate various permutations of 
possible encounters and likely patterns (e.g. chess moves, curve balls, etc) [2] 
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8 Just as a note, McDowell had defined spontaneity as “a faculty that is 
exercised in actively self-critical control of what one thinks, in the light of the 
deliverances of experience” [11]. 
9 Our responsiveness to relevant affordances are unreflective, and that 
affordances are possibilit ies for action offered by the environment”  [15] 
10 Dreyfus likens absorbed coping to an airport radio whose beacon doesn’t 
give a warning signal unless the plane strays off course. And as he then 
writes, “when the pilot is on the beam there is no experience at all”.  As 
Dreyfus puts it , “a coper must have the capacity to enter a monitoring stance 
if the brain sends an alarm signal that something is going wrong...Sensitivity 
to deviation guides one’s coping” [6][8][16] 
11 Dryfus claims that agents must be aware of concepts to have concepts 
operate upon them, but we are not conscious of concepts when we are in the 
zone, thus concepts must not be operative. Gottlieb disagrees [6][9]. 
12 McDowell argues that the dualism of norms and nature is avoided, because 
Bildung gives us the capacity to step-back (even when we are immersed into 
the flow or are in the zone), which is how strong rationality gets permeates 
into our action, including unreflective action [11][12] 
13  “The practical concepts realized in acting are concepts of things to do. 
Realizing such a concept is doing the thing in question, not thinking about 
doing it” [12].  Once Knoblauch tried to “bring the limb movements that 
contribute to [throwing the ball] within the scope of intention otherwise than 
under specificat ions, he ceased to allow his skill (i.e. his ‘ingrained bodily 
habits’) to fill in the necessary movements.  “When mindedness gets detached 
from  immersion in activity, it  can be the enemy of embodied coping”, not 
that mindedness is absent from such immersion. [9] 
14 Phronesis’s unreflective actions stems from his ethical expertise, that 
seamlessly enable him to somehow take not only all relevant virtues 
(friendship, justice, etc) into consideration but he gets things right due to 
reliable sensitivity to the demand of the specific situation and does it  at the 
right time, in the right way of acting [11]. 
15 Rietveld  raises a yellow flag with “responsiveness” to reason because it  
does not mean that reason (general or situation specific) somehow influences 
the actions of an expert.  Unlike responsiveness to normative significance, 
responsiveness-to-reason is not experienced by us in unreflective action[15]. 
16 Both Dryfus and McDowell seem to say that know-how is like intuition 
(also they say embodied coping) and that actions involving know-how are like 
absorbed coping. “Dreyfus and McDowell accept that many actions are forms 
of embodied coping, but they differ whether the embodied coping is 
conceptually shaped and, thereby, rational.  Dryfus claims that speedy actions 
are not conceptually informed and hence non-conceptual actions[9]. 
17  In Mind Over Machine Dreyfus (1986) claims, “The two highest levels of 
skill are characterized by a rapid, fluid, involved kind of behavior that bears 
no apparent similarity to the slow detached reasoning of the problem-solving 
process’. Dryfus  must then show without equivocation that bodily actions can 
outstrip reflection[9].   
18 Gottlieb highlight that Dreyfus “connects thinking about acting with the 
passage of time needed for reflection and conceptuality to contribute to 
action. Dryfus had implied that concepts had no place in our ‘flow'.  Gottlieb 
points out the fact that one can even suggest some capacities diminish 
success, is to recognize that a practical concept is a structural component of 
the action”. To accept that something can go wrong (not according to one’s 
intention conception)  is to recognize a practical concept involved in the 
action. 
19 Gottlieb highlights Dryfus’s point that “unreflective actions exhibit agency, 
and yet do not require reflection or attention. Gottlieb reframes Dryfus 
position: “Reflection is required for concepts to be operative in action. 
Because reflection is absent in fast action, action must be non-conceptual”[9].  
20  According to Dreyfus, Grandmasters typically perform actions mindlessly 
and without reflection, yet with expertise.” Dryfus has specified five stages in 
the acquisition and development of skill: novice, advanced beginner, 
competence, proficiency, and expertise. “It is not until one reaches the level 
of expertise that reflection fully drops out  [2].  As Dreyfus sees it , at  the stage 
of expertise, discrimination or ‘recognition . . . is an immediate intuitive 
response’. When one’s skills advance to a level of expertise, this stage of 
reflection drops out, which means the actual time required for carrying out 
one and the same action decreases” [9]. 
                                                                                                                 
21 Gottlieb holds that unreflective action does not make it  intelligent action.  
“There is a type of embodied intelligent at work rather than mental 
intelligence.  Because intelligence’ is not mental, and instead available in 
bodily movement, then intelligence is an embodied form of coping with what 
a specific situation requires” [9]. 
22 Gottlieb discusses “Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, for 
instance, is an argument about how perceptual experience should be 
conceived as conceptual and non-reflective at the same time. Sellars’s view of 
judgment, in contrast to Dreyfus, does not exaggerate reflection’s role in 
judgment (an anti- intellectualist  view of judgment)” [9]. 
23 In phrsonesis, McDowell and Dryfus agree that one can do things 
intelligently, yet without explicit  thought. 
24 See McDowell’s and Dryfus’s essays for further discussions regarding 
embodied coping, practical wisdom, second nature, intuitions, sheer 
receptivity, and habits, which seem similar in principle to Goettlieb’s views 
on unreflective intelligence [9][10[12]. 
25  “Phenomenology suggests that, although many forms of expertise pass 
through a stage in which one needs reasons to guide action, after much 
involved experience, the learner develops a way of coping in which reasons 
play no role” [5] 
26 Grossberg: Plasticity to stability trade off is about “where one must decide 
when to learn and when not to learn since learning involves overwriting 
previously learned patterns”.  Action on reaction is faster than acting on 
intention.  While errors can be made in the game, the difference in intensity of 
the errors varies depending on a “clutch” performer who is one that can make 
minor adjustments during competition while a “choker” who is one that over 
adjusts causing errors that amount to coming last [1] 
27 We have limited mental and emotional capital, and thus we have learned to 
be cognitively and emotionally efficient including through habit, custom, 
learning, and practice. 
28  Placing and retrieving information in and out of memory can interfere with 
processing and coordinating (which is where we mostly expend our 
concentration capital) information in the brain.  It  may appear that our reason 
and concepts aim to make themselves dispensable (shift into an un-noticeable 
background via minimal reflection) so long as optimal performance in our 
actions is not compromised [14]. 
29 Dryfus  implies that reflections are like the cognitive processes involved in 
the retrieval of relevant and pertinent information, ‘analysis and comparisons 
of alternative’s, and he also classifies explanations as a form of reflection. 
Heidegger  wants to change how we think of thinking, to take “the step back 
from the thinking that merely represents  - that is, explains – to the thinking 
that responds and recalls”[2] [16]. 
30 Gottlieb suggests that even post hoc exercise of “retroactive rationalization” 
should strengthen and not weaken the claim that concepts were, more likely 
than not, operative in flow like actions.  If asked why I made a certain move, I 
can give a reason, although I may have to think about it  in order to make it  
explicit . The fact that I cannot describe every feature of a blade of grass I saw 
does not mean that I did not see something that fits under the concept “grass.” 
A correct description of coping experience is going to be misleading, 
precisely because it  involves an attempt to describe an experience that, by 
definition, was not explicitly thematized at the time it  occurred. Why, then, 
should we focus on the unthematized experience as authoritative, rather than 
the thematized reappropriation of that experience?”  [9] 
31 It  is a common idea that people use drugs to get in an out of a feeling, 
including athletes whose obsession with winning or fear of losing 
(disappointing) motivates their drug use.  After quitting baseball, Knoblauch 
was charged with domestic violence, and use of illicit  drugs from early 2000. 
32 Gottlieb argues that Knoblauch’s inability to throw the ball does not show 
that the ability relies on a lack of conceptualization, but only that it  depends 
on a lack of explicit  conceptualization [9]. 
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